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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

THE NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A SEPARATELY
OWNED MINERAL VEIN.
By JAMES W.

SIMONTON* and STANLEY C.

MORRIS.**

Anciently in England the concept of ownership in land was inseparably connected with that of livery of seisin. Of course there
could be no livery of seisin of an unopened mineral substratum.
So it seems that at common law an unopened mine could not be
conveyed apart from the surface. Apparently only rights to enter
and take minerals could be granted' and they were held to be
incorporeal estates in the land affeeted. 2 After the Statute of Uses
had worked its complete revolution in the modes of conveyaneing
there was no longer any difficulty in conveying corporeal estates
in substrata apart from interests in the surface of lands. So the
English courts came to recognize and protect the separate ownership of subterranean strata.' It has been universally held in the
United States, where it has never been customary to convey fees
simple by livery of seisin, that a corporeal fee simple estate in a
substratum may exist and may be conveyed by apt words.4 Indeed the tendency in the United States, led by the Pennsylvania
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
** College of Law, Vest Virginia University.

See CHALLIS, REAL PRoPERTY, 3 ed., 58.
Lord MountJoy's Case, Godb. 17 (1583).
Rich v. Johnson, 2 Str. 1142 (1741); Stoughton v. Lea, 1 Taunt. 402 (1808);
Harris "'. Ryding, 5 M. & W. 60 (1839); Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739
'

(1850).
See MACSWINIEY, MINEs, 62.
4 See "Horizontal Divisions of Land",

1 Am. L. REG. (N. S.) 577.
It is submitted, however, that in many cases of conveyance of a mineral in place.
even where the mineral occurs in a solid stratum or vein the parties do not think
qf the conveyance as passing the stratum as such, but rather as simply a conveyance of the corpus of the mineral. It has even been held that there may be a fee
aimple conveyance of "undiscovered minerals": Hansen v. Hall, 167 Mich. 7, 132
See 10 MiCH. L., REv. 143.
3N. W. 457 (1911).
The prevailing doctrine, as considered in this article, results from what is believed to be too great a readiness to construe grants of minerals in place to amount
Ito -a horizontal stratification of the land. Many of the English grants seem to have
'been of the "mines", in terms; for example: Proud v. Bates, 34 L. J. Ch, 406
(1865).
American grants, on the other hand, more usually refer to "all the coal";
for example: Genet v. Delaware etc. Canal Co., 122 N. Y. 505 (1890). It is believed
that this difference of terminology is not merely accidental, but indicates a fund'
amentally different conception in the minds of the parties as to what is being done.
It is submitted that the English terminology gives more show of reason for conCompare
the "containing chamber".
struing the grants as passing an estate i
the language quoted, post, note 24.
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court, now is to construe as a grant of a corporeal estate in fee

;simple ny deed the language of which shows an intent to convey
all the obtainable minerals in a substratum, even though such instrument i called a lease and uses the terminology of leases of real
estate."
Mining operations in a substratum naturally produce chain'hers or open -spaces where the mineral has been removed. The
use which may be made of this space by the owner of the mineral
vein, where the surface is separately owned, raises a most interesting question. Apparently the right of the owner of the mineral
-vein to use this space for any operations properly connected with
the mining of his minerals in the particular tract has never been
questioned. But the right of the owner of the mineral vein to
transport through such space minerals mined from beneath adjacent lands has been attacked on several occasions, generally where
coal lands have been concerned. The typical case raising the question fairly, and the one intended herein to be discussed for the
most part, is one where the grant or reservation of coal is silent as
to the right of the owner of the coal to make use of chambers produced by mining and such owner claims the right to transport
through such chambers coal mined from beneath adjoining lands.6
The hitherto unbroken line of authority in such cases has been
that the absolute owner in fee of the mineral in place has such
r Hope's Appeal, 1 Sadler 307, 3 AtI. 23 (Pa. 1886); Montooth v. Gamble, 123
PaL St. 240, 16 AtI. 594 (1889) ; Kingsley v. Hillside Coal & Iron Co., 144 Pa. St.
613, 23 AtI. 250 (1892) ; Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. St. 293, 22
Ati. 1035 (1891) - Hosack v. Crll, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 90 (1901).
But of late the
Pennsylvania court has displayed an unwillingness to construe such deeds as grants
In the absence of language therein seeming to require it: Denniston V. Haddock,
200 Pa. St. 426. 50 Atil. 197 (1901); Coolabaugh v. Lehigh etc. Co., 219 Pa. St.
124 62 Atl. 94 (1905); Greek v. Wylie, 109 AtI. 529 (Pa. 1920). See Percy G.
Mfadeira, Jr., "Leases of Minerals as Absolute Sales-The Pennsylvania Doctrine",
64 u. OP PA. L. REV., 42. See post, note 24.
6 The case chosen for discussion is, then, one presenting a question of what the
law will imply or allow rather than of interpretation of deeds. It is intended to
exclude from particular consideration such eases as Ramsey v. Blair, [1875] 1 A. C.
701; Genet v. Delaware eto. Canal Co., supra; St. Louis Consolidated Coal Co. ',.
Schmisseur, 135 Ill. 371, 25 N. U. 795 (1890); McCracken v. Gumbert, 131 Pa.
St. 36, 18 AtI. 1068 (1890) ; Attebery v. Blair, 244 I1. 363, 91 N. E. 475 (1910) ;
Potter v. Rend, 201 Pa. St. 318, 50 At]. 821 (1902) ; and St. Louis etc. Trust Co.
v. Galloway Coal Co., 193 Fed. 106 (1911), where the words of the grant or reservation of the coal can be construed to include a right to use in this way such
subterranean chambers, and, of course, such cases as Rockafellow v. Hanover Coal
Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 241 (1893), where the grant expressly denied such right, or
such cases as Moore v. Price, 125 Ia. 353, 101 N. W. 91 (1904), and Beck V,.
Economy Coal Co., 149 Ia. 29, 127 N. W. 1109 (1910), where the grant was construed to exclude such right. Again, the typical case herein to be discussed is one
,where the grantee of' coal is transporting coal mined beneath one tract through
haulways underlying a second tract and bringing the same to the surface upon
still a third tract, and it is the owner of the second tract who contests the right
of the grantee of the coal so to move it. The question, then, is one not complicated by being entangled with a question of surface 'rights-of-way.
Whether
rightly or wrongly, courts put cases involving such questions upon a basis en'tirely different from that upon which they put cases of the type chosen for discussion: Dand v. Kingscote, 6 M. & W. 174 (1840); Hooper v. Dora Coal Mining
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right.7 In the case of Clayborn v. CamilTla Red Ash Coal Co., Inc.,'
the Virginia Supreme Court has held contra.
The possible existence of such a problem appears to have been
thought of by an English court at least as early as 1858 when, in
the case of Powell v. Aikin the court indicated by way of dictum
that such use of the space produced by mining operations could
not be made. The question seems to have first come up for decision in 1860 in the ease of Bowser v. McLean,0 where the land
affected was copyhold. A little later came the case of Proud v.
Bates," raising the question as to freehold lands. The law in
England is now settled as to both kinds of estates and is well
stated in Eardley v. Granville," where Jessel, M. R., said:
". .. The law seems to stand this way: The estate of a
copyholder in an ordinary copyhold (for it is an estate) is
an estate in the soil throughout, except as regards for this
purpose timber trees and minerals. As regards the trees and
minerals, the property remains in the lord. . The possession
is in the copyholder; the property is in the lord. If a stranger
cuts down the trees, the copyholder can maintain trespass
against the stranger, and the lord can maintain trover for the
trees .... "
It... The same rule applies to minerals as to trees. If
you once cut down the tree, the lord cannot compel the copyCo., 95 Ala. 235, 10 So. 652 (1892); Leavers v. Cleary, 75 Ill. 349 (1874)', St.
Louis Consolidated Coal Co. v. Schmisseur, su.pra" McCloskey a,. Miller, 72 Pa. St.
151 (1872) ; Stewart v. Northwestern Coal etc. Co., 147 Pa. St. 612, 23 Atl. 882
(1892), and Farrar v. Pittsburgh etc. Coal Co., 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 280 (1905).
Nor is It to be confused with the simple question of the right of access through
the superincumbent strata of a given tract to a separately owned stratum beneath
the same tract. Such right exists but rests upon different considerations from any
present in the sort of case chosen for discussion:
Mellon v. Chartlers Block Coal
Co., 152 Pa. St. 286, 25 AtI. 597 (1892).
The case to be considered is also one
where the passage-way is of a height equal to the thickness of the coal vein, where
strata above and below the ocal vein form the floor and roof of the tunnel, respectively. and are separately owned.
It is not, then, a case where the owner of
the coal has simply tunneled through his own property, but a case where he has
mined out all of the coal for the thickness of the vein and for the length and
breadth of the passageway. See note 1S, post, on this point.
7 Bowser v. McLean, 2 De G., F. & J. 415 (1860); Proud v. Bates, supra;
Hamilton v,. Graham, L. R. 2 Sc. & Div. App. 166 (1871) ; Ramsey v. Blair.
supra; Eardley v. Granville, 3 Ch. D. 826 (1876) ; Batten Poll V. Kennedy, 1 Ch.
256 (1907) ; Lillibridge % Lackawanna Coal Co.. supra; Webber v. Vogel, 159 Pa.
St. 235, 28 AtI. 226 (1898) ; s. c. 189 Pa. St. 156, 42 AtI. 4 (1899) ; New York
etc. Coal Co. v. Hillside Coal cto. Co., 225 Pa. St. 211, 74 Atl. 26 (1909) : Westerman v. Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co., 260 Pa. St. 140, 103 AtI. 539 (1918); Bagley v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 193 Ala. 229, 69 So. 17 (1915) ; Schobert V.
Pittsburgh Coal etc. Co., 254 II. 474, 98 N. E. 945 (1912) ; Madison v. Garfield
Coal Co., 114 Ia. 56, 86 N. W. -41 (1901) ; Wadsworth Coal Co. v. Silver Creek
Mining etc. Co., 40 Ohio St. 559, 567 (1884), (semble) ; Moore v. Indian Camp
Coal Co., 75 Ohio St. 493, 80 N. E. 6 (1907); Armstrong v. Maryland Coal Co.,
67 W. Va. 589, 608, 69 S. E. 195, 203 (1910), (semble).
See also MAcSwrnNEY,
Mx.qEs, 67. 104; 27 Cyc. 699; 18 R. C. L. 1149, and notes in 13 L. R. A. 627;
40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 826, and ANN. CAs. 1913 B, 1104.
05 S. E. 117 (Va. 1920).
' 4 K.
& J. 343 (1858).
o Supra, note 7.
21 Ibid.
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holder to plant another. The latter has a right to the soil in
the copyhold where the trees stood, including the stratum of
air which is now left vacant by reason of the removal of the
tree. So, if the lord takes away the minerals, the copyholder
becomes entitled to the possession of the space where the
minerals formerly were, and he is entitled to use it at his will
and pleasure. If you have a shaft made for working
the mines, the copyholder may descend in the shaft, and
either walk about in the space below or use it for any other
rational purpose. That is the position of the copyholder . . .
[the grantee of the lord's mineral rights] has, therefore, no right
to trespass on the copyhold for any purpose whatever, because
I assume he does not want it for the purpose of working the
manorial minerals; for that purpose he has a right to use it;
but assuming that he does not want it for that purpose, but
only wants it for the purpose of carrying the coal from under
Sneyd's estate-that is, foreign coal-he has no right to use
it at all. Of course the injunction to be granted will only
restrain him from using it for that purpose; it will not affect
"
the other right. ....
". .. If a freeholder grants lands excepting mines ....
he grants out his estate in parallel layers, and the grantee
only gets the parallel Jayer granted to him and does not get
any underlying mineral layer or stratum. That underlying
stratum remains in the grantor. The freeholder retains the
mineral stratum as part of his ownership; and whether or not
he takes the minerals or subsoil out of the stratum, the stratum
still belongs to him as part of the vertical section of the land.
But he says13 in the case of a copyholder, that is not so, because the copyholder, though he has no property in the stratum
in the sense of being entitled to take the minerals, has property and possession in this sense, that the moment the minerals are taken away the space is in his possession, and he only
can inte'rfere with it, the lord having no right to do so."
From this it is apparent that in one line of English cases of
which Bowser v. McLea 14 is apparently the first, the question of
the right to use the space produced in a mine arose between copyholders and the lords of the manor. In the other line of cases,
represented by Proud v. Bates,'5 the question arose between the
owners in fee of the surface and of the subterranean strata. Although in the latter line of cases it is held that the owner may use
12
V.

,.

Supra, note 7.
of the Rolls is here summarizing the law as laid down in Bowser

The blaster
McLean,
sura
21SuPra. note 7.
is Ibid.
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the spaces to transport coal mined on other lands, and in the former it is held that he may not do so, the two are not inconsistent.
Of the English cases only those involving freeholds are actual
authority in the United States, and all of these cases seem to be in
accord.'8
Coming now to the American authorities, the first case in point
of time17 as well as the leading case is Lillibridge v. Lackawanna
etc. Coal Co.,1 8 decided in 1891. Except for the recent Virginia
case supra, it has been followed by all the other American courts
wherever the question has arisen. 19 It may be fairly said that all
the other cases have adopted its analysis so that a consideration of
the reasoning of the Pennsylvania court will give a fair understanding of what has been the prevailing American theory. The
Pennsylvania court, three of the seven justices dissenting, said:
". .. Under all the decisions, the coal in place was absolutely owned in fee simple by the defendant. In a state of
nature, the coal necessarily occupied space. How could the
defendant own the coal absolutely and in fee simple, and not
own the space it occupied? Or how is it possible to conceive
of such a thing as the ownership of the space independently
of the coal? If the coal in place is a part of the very substance of the soil, more corporeal than the surface, as was said
in Caldwell v. Fulton,20 how can the law regard the space
1 But note the dissenting opinion of Lord Chelmsford in Hamilton v. Graham,
supra, where he said:
"The result of my consideration of the cases has been to lead me to the conclusion that although where mines or minerals are excepted out of a grant or leave
they may be regarded as an estate or tenement separate from the surface land, yet
the property in them is of a peculiar and limited character; it is rather a right
to take away a part of the land for the profitable enjoyment of it than to possess
it in its undisturbed natural state. If under an exception of mines or minerals a
grantor or lessor has the same property in them as any other absolute owner has
In the land belonging to him, the Appellant would have a right to grant wayleaves over the coal and limestone excepted to any person or any number of persons to carry minerals from other mines, which he might find to be a more
profitable application of his property than gradually to exhaust it by working
out the minerals."
Note also the following dictum of the court in Spoor v. Green, 9 L. R. Exch.
99, 109 (1874) : "The seam of coal, and not the space oscupied by the coal,
forms the subject-matter of the agreement. . . ."
17 The cases of Genet v. Delaware etc. Canal Co., St. Louis Consolidated Coal Co.
v. Schmisseur, and McCracken v. Gumbert, supra, were earlier American cases,
but, as shown above, are not in point.
Is Supra, note 5. Note that the Virginia court in Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash
Coal Co., supra, insists that the whole of the langauge for which this ease is
always cited in this connection is a dictum, for the reason that the passage-way
in this case was of a height less than the thickness of the coal vein, the grantee
of the coal therefore owning both a layer of coal which formed the roof of the passage-way and a layer which formed the floor thereof. However this may be, the
case has always been treated as a direct holding in line with the English authorities and has been followed as such.
19 But note inconsistent language in a case involving a different question:
Mellon v. Chartiers Block Coal Co.,supra, decided by seven Justices of whom,
curiously enough, five had sat in the Lillibridge Case. See Clayborn V. Camille
Red Ash Coal Co., supra, on this point.
= 31 Pa. St. 475 (1858).
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which the substance occupies, as other than the substance itself 21 Of course such an idea is incapable of practical application, except upon the theory that the coal is not a corporeal substance to be sold and delivered, but that only an
incorporeal right to remove it passes to the grantee under a
conveyance. And such is the real nature of the appellant's
argument. It could not be otherwise. Certainly, if such were
the nature of the defendant's right, the argument and the
authorities cited in support of it would be applicable and
of controlling force; but it is a sufficient reply to all of them
to say that all the decisions are directly the other way, and
that they all establish that a conveyance of the coal in fee
carries everything with it, just as fully and completely as a
conveyance of the soil above. . . . If, then, the coal in place is
a pure corporeal hereditament, the title in fee-simple to which
passes to a purchaser by apt conveyance, there would be no
more propriety in claiming a title in the grantor to the space
it occupies, than there would be in claiming a similar right
in a vendor of the surface to the space developed by the yendee in digging the cellar and foundations of a house. We are
altogether unwilling to adopt any such view of the rights of
the parties in either of such cases".
From this it will be seen that the Pennsylvania court considered
that there could be only two theories as to the rights of the owner
2 Just what is meant by this language is not quite clear.
Apparently the court
means to say that law cannot distinguish between space and the matter which occupies it. To philosophy, the concept of space as distinct from the matter which
occupies it seems a commonplace.
See 1 LOcKE, Hum"N UNDERSTANDING,
297:
•..
we have as clear an idea of space distinct from solidity as we have3 of

spoldity

distinct

from

motion";

JOHN

DEWEY,

LEIBNITz's

NEW

ESSAYS,

1 4,

space is not necessarily a plenum of matter. . . . Space is occupied by
matter, but there is no essential relation between them"; see also C. C. EVERETT,
PIcHTE's ScIENcE OF KNOWLEDGE, 230; JOSEPH MCCABE, HAEcKEL's RIDDLE O0
THE UNIVERSE, 245.
As is *ell pointed out in a dictum of the Pennsylvania court itself in Mellon
v. Chartiers Block Coal Co., supra: "In the earlier days of the common law the
attention of buyers and sellers and therefore the attention of the courts was fixed
upon the surface. He who owned the surface owned all that grew upon it and
all that was buried beneath it. His title extended upwards to the clouds and
downwards to the earth's centre. The value of his estate lay, however, in the
arable qualities of the surface. .. "
In 6uch a state of affairs the question of the ownership of a quantum of space
below the surface, as distinguished from the ownership of that portion of the earth's
crust which occupied it, never became of importance.
But it is submitted that
when property rights in space, as distinguished from property rights in the mattel
which occupies the space, become of importance there is no logical reason for the
law's refusing to deal with them. In this connection consider further the language of the Pennsylvania .court in the same case:
"The grantee. of the coal, owns the coal, but nothing else, save the right to take
it away. Practically considered, the grant of the coal is the grant of a right to
remove it. This right is sometimes limited in point of time; in others it is without limit. In ilther event it is the grant of an estate determinable upon the removal of the coal. It Is, moreover, a grant of an estate which 9wes a servitude
of support to the surface. When the coal is all removed the estate ends, for the
plain reason that the subject of it has been carried away. The space it occupied
reverts to the grantor by operation of law. It needs no reservation in the deed,
becaute it was never granted. The grantee has the right to use and occupy It while
engaged in t~e remo,'al of the coal, for the reason that such lise Is essential to the
enjoyment of the grant"
Note also the language used In Sl1oor v. Green, supra.
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of the mineral: (1) that, owning the coal, he owns the space
which it occupies, for the reason, either (a) that, to the law, space
and the matter which occupies it are the same thing, or (b) that,
granting space is not to the law the same thing as the matter which
occupies it, the owner of the mineral, by reason of owning it, owns
also the space which it occupies; or (2) that he has only an incorporeal right to enter and take the mineral. It considered that
the owner of the mineral could not own the corpus of the vein and
at the same time have only a limited right in the space occupied
by the mineral and that any restriction upon the mine-owner's
user of the space inconsistent with a fee simple in the space made
it something less than a fee simple; made it, in fact, an incorporeal
estate.
As a matter of fact a theory different from either of the two
which the Pennsylvania court thus considers possible, had already
been adopted in England where the question arose between a lord
of the manor and his copyholder, as has been shown. 22 It was
apparently held in such cases that the lord of the manor owned
the coal in fee and had a right to use the space for the purpose of
mining such mineral but for no other purpose. Hence the copyholder either owned the entire space occupied by the mineral from
the time of the creation of the copyhold, subject to the right of the
lord to leave the coal therein until he chose to remove it, and subject to the right of the lord to use the space while removing the
mineral, or else the copyholder's estate progressively extended to
the space as fast as the coal was removed from it,23 subject to the
lord's right to use it throughout his operations beneath the manor
itself. Whatever their basic theory, however, the English courts
found no difficulty in holding in such cases that the owner of the
-- Eardley v Granville, supra.
= The following words of the Master of

the Rolls

in the

quoted from Eardley v,. Granville, svpra, would lend cnlor
respective rights of copyholder and lord of the manor,
though he has no property in the stratum in the sense of
the mirerals, has property and possession in this sense that

extract heretofore

to this theory of the
"...
the copyholder.
being entitled to take
the moment the min-

erals are taken away the space is in his possession, and he only can interfere with
it, the lord having no right to do so". It is submitted that it would be logically
possible to hold that, whatever the rights in the space so long as occupied by the
coal where stratum and. surface are separately owned In fee, the space, as progressively mnade vacant by the removal of the coal, passes to the surface owner. Ap-

parently the only decided case in which this solution occurred to the court is
Mbore v. Indian Camp Coal Co.. supra, In which the court said:
"It is therefore illogical and inconsistent, and would be impracticable and unjust,
to hold that. as fast as the mineral is taken out, the remaining space should revert
to the owner of the upper strata. Such a narrow and technical interpretatin of
the grant would result in embarrassment to the mining industry which would be
intolerable.'" The soundness of this is not apparent
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mineral had a fee in the mineral but some lesser interest in the
space it occupied.
Conceiving only two possible theories, then, the Pennsylvania
court adopted the one that a fee simple in coal in place "carries
everything with it just as fully and completely as a conveyance of
the soil above". Such a theory presents not only difficulty in
cases where coal rights have been passed by so-called leases which
have been construed as grants, 24 but also in cases of absolute
grants of coal in place. Under the doctrine of the Pennsylvania
court it would seem, as stated by Lord Chelmsford in his dissenting opinion in Hamilton v. Graham,25 that the mine-owner, while
making only a show of carrying on his mining beneath the tract,
might let out rights-of-way through the space to owners of minerals beneath adjacent lands. And, as the Virginia court well
asks,2 if the mine-owner owns the space absolutely in fee simple
how can any restriction upon the nature of his user be imposed,
during the period of such ownership, except such as the law would
There is apparently no hint
impose upon a surface fee simple?
in the English cases that the rights of the grantee of the coal are
24Some of these so-called leases contain an express limitation of all rights thereunder to the time until all the merchantable coal shall become exhausted. Others
contain a limitation for a precise number of years. If a so-called lease can pass
a fee, in "everything" similar to a fee in surface lands, a fee simple in the coal
which the space occupies as well as in the coal itself, such fee has from the beginning and so long as it exists a fixed spatial extent. As said by the New York
court in Genet v. Delaware etc. Canal Co., supra: ". . . by the terms of the
agreement and in contemplation of the- parties, the whole body of the coal, considered as of cubical dimensions and capable of descriptive separation from the
earth above and around it, and as it lies in its place, is absolutely and presently
conveyed. The thing sold. . . can be identified as land and severed as land from
the estate of which it forms a part." Again, in Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co.,
supra, it was said: "It results from the absolute proprietorship over the mineral
in nlace, that the owner thereof has a like interest In the 'containing chamber'
until the termination of the estate. . . . The phrase 'c-ntaining chamber', as used
in the books, is simply a convenient expression for the limits or boundaries of the
grant. The grant Is an entirety and the estate thereby created is determinable as
The latter words,
a whole upon the contingency of the exhaustion of the mine."
it is true, were' used of ownership under an absolute grant. But they are applicable to a so-called lease construed as a grant. Under the doctrine of the Lilli.
bridge Case, then, when the estate of the grantee of the coal ends it ends all at
once. And, it is submitted, it can only end by operation of the limitation in the
grant. Therefore it is submitted that if leases providing for termination of all
rights thereunder upon exhaustion of all the merchantable coal pass fees simple in
the coal they must be some peculiar kind of base or terminable fees and open to
the objections urged post.
The correctness of a solution of the present problem should not be tested by its
applicability where the separate rights in the coal were created by one of these socallcd leases which the court construes as a grant. -It is submitted that it is simply wrong to construe most so-called leases as grants in fee. In Denniston v.
". . . The expression that
Haddock, supra. the Pennsylvania court itself said:
a conveyance of coal in place even by a lease for a limited term is a sale, is inaccurate as a general proposition of law and unfortunate from its tendency to
Whether it would ba better to call such an instrument accurately
mislead .....
what it certainly was at common law, a lease without impeachment of waste, or
to endeavor to reconcile all the decisions by calling it a conditional sale, it Is not
necessary at present to discuss. . . . th'e rules applicable to sales are not to be
applied indiscriminately to such instruments...."
g Supra, note 7.
* Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., suprm.
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not thus free of qualification or restriction.2 7 Yet such unqualifled and unrestrained user of the space was obviously never within
the intent of the parties. The Pennsylvania court, apparently recognizing this fact, said by way of dictum in Webber v. Vogela
that the right to transport coal from beneath adjacent land,
through space in particular land, exists only so long as the par29
ticular land is being mined in good faith.
Again, in the same case the Pennsylvania court said that, upon
the exhaustion of the coal vein, the owner of the land above and
below the coal has a right to the space formerly occupied thereby.
It is submitted that this result can only be arrived at under the
doctrine of the Lillibridge Case by holding that such owner has
by implication (1) some right in the coal vein analogous to a possibility of reverter, or (2) a possibility of reverter, or (3) that
there is a limitation in favor of the grantor and his heirs and assigns. 3 Any of these holdings involves difficulties. To hold that there
is some interest analogous to a possibility of reverter subsisting in
favor of the owner of the residue of the land is open to the objection that it creates by implication an interest in land hitherto unknown to the law and therefore bad.3 To hold that what the
grantor of the coal has is a true possibility of reverter is, of course,
to reduce the estate of the grantee of the coal to a mere base or
terminable fee. It is questionable whether such an estate can exist
2
in those states where the statutes of Quia Emptores is in force.3
z See English cases cited, supra, note 7.
Supra, note 7.
: Directly contra is the dictum of the West Virginia court In Armstrong v.
Maryland Coal Co., supra. It is- submitted that the dictum of the West Virginia
court is correct, under the doctrine of the Lillibridge Case. If the grantee of the
coal has a fee simple estate in the whole of the space occupied thereby, or, later,
in such-space as may have been made vacant by the removal of the coal, such fee
simple interest to last until the exhaustion of the coal, how can it be contended
that his continuing to have any such Interest depends upon his mining the coal In
good faith?
Suppose there were a grant to A and his heirs until A becomes
President of the United States. Could It be contended that A is under any legal
or equitable duty to try -in, gdod faith to become President as quickly as possible
and thus quickly to end his fee? To ask such questions is to demonstrate that, as
indicated by the Virginia court in Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co.. supra,
this collateral, afterthought restriction of the doctrine Is inherently Incapable of
practical application.
Note-that the question of the duty of the grantee of the coal to mine faithfully
to keep royalties up to a given minimum per year, or- under express or implied
covenants to develop diligently, is a-different question entirely.
V The suggestion of the court in the Webber Case that the grantor of the coal
has a "reversion" is obviously untenable.
31 1 WAsHBURN, REAL PRoPERTY, 6 ed., 72.
3.The late Professor Gray of Harvard -considered that the effect of.Quia E,nptorcs,
STAT. WE T m, 111, 18 EDW. -1, C. 1, was- to abolish base or terminable fees.
GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3 ed., J§ 31-42, Appendix, §§" 774-188.
It is ohly ftir to the Pennsylvania court to say, however. that. Quia -Emptores
seems niever to havd beekr in farce 'there by reason of the form of the grant by
the Crown to William Penn: Ingersoll*0. Sergeant, 1 Whart: 337- (Pa. 1836) ; Sheets
v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. St. 126 (1847) ; Pennsylvania RR. Co. v. Parke; 42 Pa. St. 31
(1862) ; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. St 335 (1868); Siegel v. Lzuer, 148 Pa. St.
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But granting that such an interest in land can still exist, to hold
that the grantor here has a possibility of reverter is to give it to
him by implication. It is believed no court has heretofore gone so far
as to create such an interest in land by implication. Again, if it be
held that there is an implied limitation in favor of the grantor, his
heirs and assigns, upon the exhaustion of the coal, there is thereby
created a future estate which would be within the rule against
33
perpetuities and probably void.
Enough has been said to show the difficulties in which the Pennsylvania court has become entangled in its attempt to qualify
the doctrine of the Lilibridge Case, in order to give effect to what
it must have recognized to be the intent of the parties in such
cases. It is submitted that the difficulty, if not impossibility,
of so qualifying the doctrine demonstrates its inherent incorrectaess. It is believed that the fundamental error was made in holding that the grant was not only of the coal in place but also of all
the space within the limits or boundaries thereof. It is submitted
that this was never the intent of the parties.
The question of the rights of a purchaser of timber trees as
compared with those of the grantee of a coal vein was noticed in
the Lillibridge Case and also by the Virginia court.3 " It is submitted that the Virginia court is correct in insisting that the two
cases are logically comparable. If a mine-owner acquires rights
in fee in the space from which he has removed the coal, it is arguable that the purchaser of timber trees acquires rights in fee in
the irregular columns of air in which such trees stood, exercisable
after the same have been removed. But the application of the logic
of the situation to rights of way hardly seems the best one by
which to show the untenableness of the theory of rights in fee in
236, 23 AtI. 996 (1892) ; but contra, Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. St. 492 (1863),
a case which, Professor Gray says: "In fact. . . . is unintelligible". It appears,
then, that a terminable fee in Pennsylvania is quite possible.
33 GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3 ed., § 317.
Since no life or lives in being would be affected In these cases, the future estate herein contemplated would have to vest within a gross period of 21 years or
Kimball V.
be void: Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs, 45 Pa. St. 9, 29 (1863).
Crocker, 53 Me. 263 (1865) ; Andrews V. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 50 AtI. 898 (1901).
A
U Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., supra. The court said: ".....
somewhat similar situation arises when one buys a standing tree. He gets the
but
removal,
and
support
for
easement
an
with
tree as a part of the real estate,
he does not acquire any corporeal right in the soil or in the space which the tree occupies. . . . The right to mine is an incorporeal hereditament, an easement expressed
in or incident to the grant of the fee, and in the exercise of this easement the
grantee has no more right to put an additional burden upon the servient estate
than he would have to haul timber from an adjoining tract over a tract upon which
be bad bought the timber with the right of removal. It is only fair to say that
this view is directly challenged and rejected in the Pennsylvania case under consideration."
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the resulting space. A more convincing application would, it is
submitted, be this: Why might not the purchaser of the giant
trees of a redwood forest erect in the column of air previously occupied by one such tree a wireless tower, or some other such erection, and maintain the same there pending his severing the other
trees, however long that might be? It will probably not be seriously contended that the purchaser of the trees gets any such
right.
So much for the difficulties encountered by the Pennsylvania
doctrine. It is believed that these difficulties chiefly inhere in the
idea that a fee simple in a substratum is identical in nature with
a fee simple in land in general. As Lord Chelmsford well says in
Hamilton v. Graham,5 "the property in [such strata] is of a
peculiar and limited character". It is not meant to say that the
estates in such strata are not fees simple.3 8 But does it, therefore,
necessarily follow that the "natural rights" and incidents inherihg
in such fees are identical with those attaching to surface fees?
To say that such fees of necessity carry "everything" which attaches to surface fees is to follow what Justice Holmes has so aptly
described as "the illusion of mathematical certainty in legal reasoning 3T and to be blinded by terminology. A fee simple is simply the
estate of highest dignity which the law will allow in the subjectmatter thereof. And it is submitted that, on principle, the law
ought to allow an estate of somewhat different quality in a substratum from that which it will allow in surface lands. Surface
lands are acquired to be husbanded and enjoyed in approximately
their natural state. But mineral substrata are acquired only to be
severed, exhausted and carried away. Continuing and exclusive
possession against the whole world and of the whole area affected
is essential to the purposes of a surface fee simple. Therefore a
conveyance of such a fee may well be considered to have passed
the right to such possession insofar as such right is not limited by
law.3 But the purchaser of a mineral vein is interested only in
3

Supra, note 7.

3 It has been suggested that while inheritable freeholds, such estates are not
fees simple. But the learned author of this suggestion himself admits it finds no
support in decided cases: 1 MINoR, REAL PROPERTY, 210.
3T HOLMES,

COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs,

126.

The court in the Lillibridge Case was particularly inapt in the portion of the

opinion set out in this article, in seeking to draw a

parallel between

the digging

of a cellar by a surface grantee and the removal of the coal by the grantee thereor.
There is no parallel in the two situations whatever. The surface vendee has acquired whatever rights his vendor had In this part of the land. Had the vendee
purchased the surface of rocky land merely to quarry it out in this manner, the
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reducing the same to personalty. Therefore continued and exclusive possession of the space occupied by the mineral is necessary only until this purpose is accomplished. This, together with
an incorporeal right to use the vacant space progressively produced, as of the mine-owner's right of access, in any operations
beneath the particular tract, is, it is submitted, all the law ought
to allow to the fee simple owner of the mineral.
Such an outcome, as the Virginia court well points out, seems
in harmony with the intent of the parties in the average case.
*Where A, owning land in fee simple, grants to B the coal therein
in fee simple, it is submitted that it was not the intent of the parties that B should have more than the coal and the right to remove the same whenever he chooses. It is not intended, certainly,
that B have any rights to last beyond the time when the coal is
exhausted. It is submitted that this intent of the parties can be
given effect in a manner consistent with legal principles by holding that B gets a fee simple in the coal, but not in the space it
occupies. 39 This theory gives B the rights in the space necessary
to give him what it was intended he should have.
This theory upholds the existence of a fee simple in the corpu
of the coal where the same has been created by a proper grant or
reservation and it avoids most if not all of the difficulties encountered by the doctrine of the Lillibridge Case. This theory
avoids, for one thing, the difficulty about the terminability of the
fce. If the fee simple is conceived of as existing only in the substance of the coal it expires upon the complete severance and reduction of the coal to personalty. 40 If, on the other hand, the fee
parties would be in a relation having some similarity to that of the vendor and
vendee of the coal.
3' The doctrine of the Lillibridge Case is not that the right therein recogcnized
exists because of a corporeal estate in the owner of the coal in the strata immediately above and below the coal. The Virginia court seems, in the Clayborn Case,
conc...
to have understood, however, that the Lillibridge Case "contended .
veyance of the coal carried with it the stratum above and below the coal." A
recent writer notes "some cases going to the extent of saying that an estate in
the substratum or shell is also granted", although not specifying the Lillibridge
CCse: 7 V,. L. REV. 404. Another cites the Lillibridge Case as authority to the
effect that the grantee of the coal gets "a corporeal estate in the walls containing
34 HAaV. REV. 677. It is submitted that the Lillibridge Case simthe coal":
ply holds that the grantee of the coal also acquires the space it occupies
in fee and by reason of that fact may make any use of it he chooses
In that view he is entitled to support for
-during the time he so owns it.
u track laid upon the lower stratum just as he is to the natural right of subjatrue interpretation of the doctrine is set
This
place.
in
coal
the
of
cent support
out in the concluding sentence of the opinion in Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co.,
as we have endeavored to make clear,
claim,
defendants
the
.supra: ".... here
the right to use their own property as a way for transporting coal mined on adjacent estates".
"When the coal
'9 In Mellon v. Chartiers Block Coal Co.. supra, the court said:
is all removed the estate ends for the plain reason that the subject of it has been
carried away."
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simple is also in a certain definite amount of space, it could only
expire by means of an implied limitation in the grant or by means
of some sort of implied possibility of reverter.
It remains to notice the practical expediency of the Virginia
court's decision. If the rule of the Lillibridge Case has become
a settled rule of property the wisdom of changing it now might
be questionable, however desirable from the standpoint of legal
theory. In Olayborn v. Cami la Red Ash Coal Co., 1 the question
arose under a grant which antedated the Lillibridge Case. So the
court considered that even if there were a settled rule of property
to the effect contended for it would not apply to the case before
it. It is indicated, however, that the court does not consider the
Pennsylvania doctrine a settled rule of law. If it be not, the Virginia court is to be commended for a decision which serves, perhaps, to reopen a matter in which the law is in danger of crystallizing in a form believed to be incorrect. It is submitted that the
Virginia court has arrived at the proper concrete result.
41 Supra, note 8.
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